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Abstract
This study makes use of farm-level data from the Agricultural Census to evaluate the effects of the
1996  Federal  Agriculture  Improvement  and  Reform  (FAIR)  Act,  which  intended  to  “decouple”
commodity payments from production decisions.  Prior to this Act, agricultural support payments were
linked to production decisions via prices and a complex set of restrictions that acted to control the
supply of agricultural commodities.  We compare farm-level 1992-to-1997 changes in commodity crop
plantings of farms that participated in government programs with farms that did not participate.  We
find that the growth rate of program-crop acreage of non-participants was 19 percentage points below
that of participants. This estimated difference remains unchanged after we account for unobserved
effects relating to farm size, type, location, and interactions of these factors using over 1900 fixed-
effects variables.  These results may imply that program participation rules associated with pre-1996
programs  effectively  acted  to  limit  program  acreage  in  1992.    An  alternative  explanation  is  that
payments associated with decoupled programs instituted with the 1996 Act were in fact distortionary
and induced farmers to produce more than they would have without the payments.  Additional research
would be needed to test these competing theories.
                                                
* Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. The views expressed are those of the authors and
do not necessarily correspond to the views or policies of ERS, or the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Senior
authorship is not assigned.  Do not cite or quote without expressed permission of the authors.  Direct
correspondence to: Michael Roberts, mroberts@ers.usda.gov, (202) 694-5557.2
Introduction
Decoupled payments are lump-sum income transfers to farm operators that do not depend on
current production or commodity prices.  Agricultural payments were decoupled in the U.S. in 1996, in
part to improve economic efficiency and to satisfy obligations to international trade agreements.  Prior
to this Act, agricultural support payments were linked to production decisions via prices and a complex
set of restrictions that acted to control the supply of agricultural commodities. The payment decoupling
that occurred with the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act was expected to
enhance efficiency by removing constraints on planting and distortionary incentives to over-produce.
1
This  paper  uses  farm-level  data  from  the  Agricultural  Census  to  evaluate  the  effect  of  the  1996
commodity payment decoupling—a regime change in which payments with strong links to production
decisions are removed and replaced with payments with few or no links to production decisions.  We
explore whether decoupling caused farmers to increase or reduce land allocated to program crops.  In
doing so, we gain insight into the degree to which the 1996 decoupling reduced, or even potentially
increased, production of program crops.  These findings will inform debates on future agricultural
policy reforms and are especially relevant to the on-going World Trade Organization (WTO) talks, in
which possible distortions created by agricultural support programs in industrialized countries have
become a major source of contention.
Prior to 1996, deficiency payments and commodity loan programs were the main source of
U.S. government agricultural support.  These programs essentially placed a floor under the price that
participating farmers received for their crops.  By raising the price farmers could expect to receive and
reducing price risk, deficiency payments would have had the effect of stimulating output.  To prevent
excess supply, acreage limitation and set-aside provisions were used to limit production and program
costs.  In addition, prior to 1996, program enrollment was based on a five-year planting history, which
created  a  further  potential  market  distortion  due  to  the  incentive  to  maintain  acreage  to  ensure
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eligibility for future payments. Although particular features of government programs often varied from
year to year, farm programs before 1996 can be characterized as being largely coupled because of their
strong links to farmers’ production decisions.  Given the complicated nature of these former programs,
which included offsetting features requiring farmers to idle (leave fallow) a certain portion of their
acreage, the extent to which these programs impacted production, and even the net direction of any
impacts, remain unclear.
Decoupled payments to farmers began with the Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) program
in the 1996 Farm Act.  PFC payments were based on historically-enrolled contract acreage, not current
plantings.  Farmers in the PFC program were given almost complete flexibility in deciding what crops
to plant, subject to some land management regulations.  The Act also fixed contract acreages (called
“base acres”) at 1995 levels.  Because the levels of decoupled payments were independent of farmers’
production decisions and market prices, it has been maintained that these programs minimally affect
production.    The  1994  Uruguay  Round  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)
included  commitments  by  developed  nations  to  reduce  subsidies  for  agriculture,  but  permitted
domestic support measures if they had a “minimal impact” on production or trade, did not increase
market prices or consumer costs, and were financed by general tax revenues.  Such so-called "green
box"  policies  include  decoupled  income  support  for  producers.    Although  decoupled  payments
theoretically  should  be  minimally  trade  distorting  under  certain  conditions,  there  have  been  few
empirical studies to verify this theory.  Decoupled payments may distort production by allowing for
greater agricultural investment via wealth effects, and by creating expectations of future payments that
influence current production decisions (Hennessy, 1998; Tielu and Roberts, 1998).
Although other studies have attempted to estimate production effects resulting from decoupled
payments using cross-sectional data (eg., Goodwin and Mishra, 2002), we are not aware of any studies
that estimate the degree to which the 1996 Act affected production distortions.  In this study, we use
farm-level panel data from the US Agricultural Census from 1992 and 1997 to estimate the effect of
payment decoupling on agricultural production.  The Agricultural Census includes information on the4
amount  of  land  allocated  to  particular  crops,  total  government  payments,  and  land  set-aside  in
accordance to program requirements.
Our  basic  empirical  approach  is  to  compare  the  growth  in  program  crop  acreage  of  farms
participating in government programs with the growth of those not participating, controlling for farm
sales  class,  farm  type,  location  and  other  farm  and  operator  characteristics.  If  coupled  program
payments previously caused farms to over-produce program crops, we would expect decoupling to
reduce plantings of program crops for program participants relative to non-participants.  Thus, program
participants should have increased (decreased) their acreage in program crops between 1992 and 1997
by  less  (more)  than  non-participants.    On  the  other  hand,  if  acreage  reduction  provisions  that
accompanied  program  participation  effectively  restricted  program-crop  plantings  in  1992,  then
decoupling  could result in a  greater  (smaller) increase (decrease) in  program  acreage  for  program
participants relative to non-participants.
Our identification of the effects of decoupling exploits an exogenous policy change (the 1996
Act) coupled with ex-ante variation in government program participation.  Farms with similar cash
sales  of  program  crops,  located  in  the  same  state,  and  producing  the  same  crops  in  1992  were
differentially  affected  by  the  1996  Act  because  of  differential  participation  in  government  farm
programs.  Prior to 1996, restrictions on what could be planted on base acreage elicited less than full
participation in government programs – between 60 and 85 percent of qualified acres for most program
crops, and markedly less for oats.
2  In our sample, approximately 18% of farms did not participate in
government programs.
Since farms are not randomly assigned to participate or not in farm programs, the empirical
challenge faced in this paper is to control for unobserved factors that could influence both program
participation and plantings of program crops.  Using a unique panel data set comprised of the Census
microfiles, we control for time-invariant unobserved factors by examining farm-specific changes in
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program-crop acreage between 1992 and 1997.  We also control for fixed affects associated with farm
type,  scale,  and  location,  as  well  as  operator  age.    These  controls  allow  us  to  compare  program
participants and non-participants that are otherwise similar.  We explore the possibility of remaining
sample  selection  bias  (that  unobserved  determinants  of  program  participation  are  correlated  with
determinants  of  program-acreage  growth)  by  examining  the  sensitivity  of  the  estimated  difference
between  participants  and  non-participants  as  we  introduce  more  controls  in  to  the  analysis.    The
robustness  of  this  difference  over  a  range  of  controls  provides  evidence  that  the  estimated  effect
reflects a causal relationship (Altonji et al, 2000).
Preliminary results indicate that decoupling caused farms participating in programs in 1992 to
increase  their  acreage  in  program  crops  by  about  19.2  percentage  points  more  than  farms  not
participating in farm programs.
3   Among farms that did not change size between 1992 and 1997,
program crop acreage increased by about 8.3 percentage points more for participants compared to non-
participants.
Background
Before 1996, the largest farm subsidy payments took the form of price-contingent payments.  The
government assured a minimum per-acre return on program crops using target prices and loan rates.  In
exchange for some of these guarantees, farmers were required to limit planting of program crops to
some proportion of their historically-based program acreages.  These limits were designed to mitigate
over-production  induced  by  price-contingent  payments.    However,  the  limitations  connected  to
program eligibility also created new potential distortions, because they gave farmers an incentive to
farm land more intensively, and also discouraged farmers from changing crops in response to changing
commodity prices, input costs, or newly invented seed varieties and farming technologies.  The many
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contingencies  farmers  accepted  in  order  to  obtain  the  payments  presumably  tended  to  reduce  the
overall value of the payments they received. In some instances, the costs of the additional restrictions
may have outweighed the payment benefits.  Thus, it is not surprising that between 10 and 40% of land
eligible for enrollment in these programs was not enrolled, despite the payment benefits.
Farm  programs  began  adding  planting  flexibility  and,  thus,  possibly  reducing  distortions
gradually with the Food Security Act of 1985.  Perhaps the largest change occurred in 1996, a time
when  market  prices  stood  well  above  target  prices  and  government  payments  to  farmers  were
historically low.  The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) significantly
modified price supports so that the  bulk  of  payments  would  subsequently  derive  from  Production
Flexibility  Contracts  (PFC),  which  did  not  depend  on  farmers’  current  production  decisions.
4  The
amounts of these payments depended only on land enrolled in farm programs prior to 1996 and were
scheduled to decline modestly over a seven-year horizon.  Unlike earlier payments, these payments
were not tied to prices and placed few restrictions on farmers’ planting decisions.  In subsequent years,
however, after prices declined, Marketing Loss Assistance (MLA) payments were provided to farmers.
The levels of these payments were tied to already-scheduled PFC payments, not to current production
decisions.  The 1996 Act also did away with annual supply management (acreage reduction) programs.
Unlike the payment programs prior to 1996, nearly all qualifying acres were enrolled in PFC and MLA
programs.    Full  participation  in  these  programs  was  unsurprising  as  there  were  few  costs  or
contingencies required in order to receive payments.
5,6
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below market prices for commodities, and so were unlikely to affect production in these years.
5 Two eligibility restrictions made these payments less than fully-decoupled from the outset.  First, participation required
that the land remain in crops, ranching, or forest-related uses.  Second, farmers could not plant fruit or vegetable crops
unless they had a history of planting these crops.  (Historically, fruit and vegetable producers have not received income
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The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 continued PFC payments under a new
name  (“direct  payments”)  and  introduced  “counter-cyclical”  payments.    Although  counter-cyclical
payments are decoupled in the sense that they are not contingent on farmers’ current production, they
are tied to market prices of crops historically grown on the land.  The 2002 Act also increased loan
rates for most crops (which do depend on current production).  In this paper, we focus on the original
PFC payments, because these are the payments to which our data pertain.
Decoupled payments, production, and trade
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 placed limits on
domestic agricultural subsidies for the first time.  In order to reduce trade distortions brought about by
domestic agricultural programs, GATT signatories established the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and agreed to limit expenditures on agricultural subsidies, with exceptions made for decoupled income
support payments.
7  This exception was made because these kinds of payments theoretically have little
or no effect on production or trade.   With total farm program payments in the U.S. exceeding $20
billion annually in the years 1999-2001, a large portion stemming from PFC and MLA payments,
many began to question whether or not these payments were in fact minimally production distorting.
These payments did possess some planting restrictions and some suggested the payments influenced
production via indirect channels.  Others questioned the basic theoretical reasoning underlying the non-
distortionary effects of decoupled payments.
Economists have offered several reasons why PFC, MLA, and counter-cyclical payments may
affect production and trade, despite having few direct connections to planting decisions.  Most of these
reasons involve indirect effects stemming from the increased wealth the payments provide farmers.
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Greater wealth may allow farmers to more easily finance their operations and cope with year-to-year
fluctuations  in  profits,  effectively  reducing  farming  costs.    It  is  plausible  that  wealth  effects  are
important for some farmers, such as those near the brink of solvency. It is less plausible (theoretically)
that these effects are important for aggregate production.  Even if some farmers pay higher interest
rates or are credit constrained, it unlikely that all farmers are credit constrained.  If constrained farmers
did not receive payments, one might expect unconstrained farmers to outbid constrained farmers for
key resource inputs (such as land) and thereby mitigate aggregate production effects stemming from
these constraints or relief of these constraints.
Others have argued that farmers are risk averse and that they become less risk averse as they
become wealthier (Hennessy, Sumner).  Thus, as farmers receive more government payments, they
collectively become less risk averse, and as a result, may be willing to produce more.  Economic
theory  suggests  that  these  effects  would  be  small.
8    Furthermore,  if  risk  aversion  truly  limited
production, this would generate a competitive advantage for wealthier and less risk-averse farmers.  It
is not clear whether many strongly risk-averse farmers could remain viable in a competitive market.
Thus,  theoretically,  it  seems  decoupled  payments  could  have  no  more  than  a  minimal  effect  on
production via wealth and risk effects.
9  An important counter to this argument is that behavior toward
risk is poorly understood.  Empirical findings show considerable evidence against basic theoretical
reasoning that underlies the standard economic notion of risk aversion (Rabin and Thaler).
Alternatively, decoupled payments may act to reduce production if they cause farmers, who
feel wealthier due to the payments they receive, to work less both on and off the farm. To the extent
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In other words, this argument suggests that the wealth effect associated with risk aversion is larger for these payments than
for PFC payments (Hennessy).9
that farmers receiving payments may work less because they feel richer, there are others in the rural
economy  who  might  replace  their  lost  work  effort.    With  or  without  decoupled  payments,  theory
suggests that farmers would collectively produce about the same amount in aggregate, even in light of
credit constraints, risk, and labor-related wealth effects.
Others have argued that PFC and MLA payments affect production and trade because they do
not give farmers complete planting flexibility and thus are not fully decoupled.  In particular, receipt of
these payments precludes planting of fruits or vegetables.  Although planting of fruits and vegetables is
unlikely to be viable in many regions of the U.S. that traditionally produce field crops, these effects
may be important in some regions (Sumner).
Empirical  measurement  of  production  distortions  stemming  from  decoupled  payments  is
difficult.  Estimates of coupled-payment production distortions are usually constructed by assuming
that a coupled payment of $1 per unit of a commodity output (or input) causes a production response
equal  to  that  caused  by  a  $1  per  unit  price  increase,  which  can  be  estimated  using  historical
relationships between prices and production.  However, due to the complicated nature of the supply-
control contingencies that existed prior to 1996, and the fact that these contingencies often changed
over time, estimation of production effects for these programs is quite difficult (e.g., McDonald and
Sumner).  However, the approach for coupled payments, which infers production responses from price
responses, does not apply to decoupled payments—this approach simply predicts zero effect.
Rather than attempt to measure the distortionary effect of decoupled payments, in this paper we
examine the distortion of decoupled payments as compared to distortions caused by pre-FAIR-Act
payments.  If decoupled payments are truly non-distortionary, our results give estimates of aggregate
production distortions in 1992.
Methods
Our empirical estimates are based on a simple concept: the event of decoupling (the 1996 Act) would
be expected to affect farms constrained by pre-1996 programs and would not be expected to directly10
affect similar farms that were not constrained by the program.
10  Our “control” group is comprised of
all farms not participating in government programs in both 1992 and 1997.  The “treatment” group is
comprised of all other farms that were constrained by the 1992 farm programs and were therefore
directly affected by the 1996 Act (decoupling).  We compare the 1992-1997 change in program-crop
acreage for the control and treatment groups.
Since program participation is not randomly assigned across farms, our empirical approach is to
control for unobserved factors that influence both program participation and  plantings  of  program
crops—factors which might confound the estimated effect of the 1996 Act.  Using a unique data set
comprised of the Census microfiles, we control for most of the likely unobserved factors by examining
farm-specific  changes  in  program-crop  acreage  between  1992  and  1997.    By  examining  acreage
changes rather than levels we remove all unobserved factors that are time invariant.  We then use the
operator’s age and a series of fixed effects to control for farm type, scale, and location, as well as
interactions of these variables.  These controls allow us to compare farm operations in our treatment
and  control  groups  that  were  quite  similar  in  1992,  although  some  were  constrained  by  the  1992
programs  and  others  were  not.    We  explore  the  possibility  of  remaining  selectivity  bias  (that
unobserved  determinants  of  program  participation  are  confounded  with  determinants  of  program-
acreage growth) by examining the sensitivity of the estimated difference between treatment and control
groups as we include more controls.  If observed variables are any guide to the confounding effects of
unobserved factors, then robust findings over a range of controls provides evidence that our estimated
effect is causal (Altonji et al, 2000).
The dependent variable of interest is the change in program acres planted between the 1992 and
1997 censuses.  Program acres are the sum of acres planted to corn, wheat, sorghum, oats, cotton, rice,
and barley.  We define the percentile point change as
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equilibrium changes in commodity or input prices.11
∆Pi  = 100 * (1997 program acres – 1992 program acres) / (½ *(1997 program acres + 1992 program acres)).
We use the average of 1992 and 1997 plantings as a base because this measure has a distribution that is
far less skewed and therefore less susceptible to the influence of outliers.
The key explanatory variable is the indicator variable for our control group: non-participants in
commodity programs in 1992 and 1997.  We measure participation in 1992 by all farms planting
program  crops  and  reporting  set-aside  acreage.    This  indicates  participation  in  1992  because  all
participating farmers were required to set aside (leave fallow) a portion of their “base acreage.”  It is
important to note, however, that non-participation in commodity programs in 1992 does not imply that
government programs did not influence behavior.   Program  participation precluded  a  farmer  from
expanding acreage beyond  a  share  of  base  acreage,  equal  to  the  average  acreage  plantings  of  the
program crop over the previous five years.  Thus, some farmers had an incentive not to participate in
the farm program for a year or more in order to “build base” in anticipation of future government
payments.    After  the  1996  Act,  farmers’  base  acres  were  frozen  at  1995  levels,  so  there  was  no
incentive in 1997 for farmers to build base.   We define non-participation in government programs as
not  having  set-aside  acres  in  1992  and  not  receiving  payments  in  1997  (there  were  no  set  aside
requirements  in  1997).      This  measure  of  non-participation  excludes  “base  builders”  who  did  not
participate in 1992 (no 1992 set-aside acres) but continued to be involved in the programs, as indicated
by non-zero 1997 payments.
It is not clear why some farmers chose not to participate in farm programs in 1997.  After the
1996 Act, there were few apparent costs for participating in government farm programs and obtaining
PFC payments.  Indeed, participation records suggest that nearly all qualified base acreage received
PFC payments in 1997.  Census records indicate, however, that 35,461 farms in our selected sample of
192,765  farms  (described  below)  were  non-participants  under  our  definition.    Because  nearly  all
qualifying acreages received payments in 1997, a logical conclusion is that many farms did not register
their  plantings  with  county  agricultural  offices  and  therefore  did  not  accumulate  qualifying  base12
acreages before the 1996 Act.  Some farmers may have valued the flexibility of non-participation and
may not have anticipated the decoupling of the 1996 Act.  A majority of these non-participating farms
were small farms with less than $35,000 per year in sales.  Thus, even if these farms had anticipated
decoupling under the 1996 Act, the transaction costs of reporting acreages to county offices might have
exceed program benefits.  For larger farm-class categories, there is a smaller share of non-participating
farms, but the share is not insignificant.  In our largest sales class (farms with more than $246,927 in
1992 sales) 831 farms in our sample (4.5% of this sales class) were non-participants.
The treatment group (“Participants”) is comprised of all farms not in the control group.  In our
analysis  we  also  separately  consider  “Base  Builders,”  the  farms  not  enrolled  in  1992  government
programs that received government payments in 1997.
Besides the treatment and control indicators, we make use of a series of control variables to
examine  the  sensitivity  of  our  estimated  effects  of  the  1996  Act.    These  explanatory  variables
(controls) include the age of the operator in 1992 and a series of indicator variables.  These indicator
variables include:
Fixed effects for 1992 sales.  These variables classify farms into five categories based on quantiles of
the distribution total farm sales in 1992.  The first quantile includes all farms with sales less than the
40% quantile; the second all farms in the 40-60% quantile range; the third includes all farms in the 60-
80% quantile range; the includes fourth all farms in the 80-90% quantile range; and the fifth includes
all farms above the 90% quantile.  We choose quantiles in this way because the distribution of farm
sales (like all other measures of scale) is strongly skewed to the right.
Fixed effects for each state.  Classifies each farm according to the U.S. state in which it resides.
Fixed effects for each SIC code.  Classifies  each  farm  according to its 6-digit Standard  Industrial
Classification (SIC) code, indicating the operation is a wheat, rice, corn, soybean, cash grain, or cotton13
farm. (Note that we drop the first two digits (01) in our tables because these are the same for all SIC
codes considered.)
SIC code specific fixed effects for total sales.  These variables classify each farm into one of five sales-
class categories that are specific to each SIC code.  Unlike the sales classes described above for all
farms, this classification considers the quantiles (40%, 60%, 80%, and 90%) from the 1992 distribution
of farm sales of each SIC code separately and categorizes each farm accordingly.
State-SIC code specific fixed effects for total sales.  These variables classify each farm into one of five
sales-class categories according to quantiles from distribution of each state and SIC code.
State-SIC code specific fixed effects for program-crop sales.  These variables are like the previous ones
except they consider only program-crop sales rather than sales of all farm products.
We estimate the effect of the 1996 Act by estimating a series of regressions each having the
following structure:
∆Pi  = α + β1 NPi  + controlsi + εi ,
where NPi is an indicator variable for whether a farm was a “Non-Participant”, α represents aggregate
changes, and εi represents unobserved determinants of ∆Pi.  To gain insight into the exogeneity of NPi,
we investigate how our estimate of β1 changes as more controls are added to the specification.  As
more controls are incorporated into the model, the less selection is based on unobservables.  If the
observable variables are representative of all determinants of ∆Pi, and greater or lesser incorporation of
controls  has  little  effect  on  the  estimated  coefficients,  it  suggests  that  NPi  is  uncorrelated  with
remaining unobservables, and that our estimates are unbiased (Altonji et al, 2000).14
Data
Data on farm and operator characteristics are from the farm-level files of the 1992 and 1997
Agricultural Censuses maintained by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.  The Agricultural Census is conducted every five years and it includes
essentially all farms in the U.S.  Merging Census records from 1992 and 1997 by farm operation
resulted in a panel data set with 2,083,386 observations.  The sample was restricted to continuing
operations defined as those operations having positive sales in both Censuses. Since we are interested
primarily in how growers of program crops are affected by the 1996 Act, we further restrict the sample
to those farms that had positive sales of program crops in 1992 and average sales of program crops in
the two census years between $100 and $2,000,000.  We define “program crops” to include corn,
wheat, barley, oats, cotton, rice, and sorghum.
We further restrict the sample to farms with one of six SIC codes (111, 112, 115, 116, 119, and
131) corresponding to wheat, rice, corn, soybean, cash grain, and cotton farms.  Although soybeans
were not a program crop prior to 1996, soybeans are typically rotated with program crops, so these
farms tend to have a large amount of program acreage and therefore received government payments.
Cash grain farms are farms with a mix of field crops, many of which are program crops.  These six SIC
codes comprise a large majority of program crop acreage.
Finally, because the Census reports harvested acreage and not planted acreage, farms with any
failed cropland (with planted acres that were not harvested) are dropped from the sample—the Census
does not identify which crops failed, only the total number of acres failed.  With these restrictions, the
sample used in this study consists of 192,765 operations observed in both censuses.
Results
Table  1  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  the  different  farm-program  participation  groups.
About 18% of the farms in the sample are characterized as Non-Participants and 23% as Base Builders.
The table shows that, over the entire sample, program-crop acres from 1992 to 1997 remained roughly15
constant, increasing by just 0.59%.   However, the average change in these acres varies across our
different participation groups.  While Non-Participants experienced declines of program-crop acres of
17.25% on average, program-crop acreage increased by an average of 4.39% for Base Builders and
1.89% for all Participants. This simple comparison of average growth rates implies that the 1996 Act
markedly increased domestic production of program crops for participating farmers.
Table 1 also presents information about total farm-program payments per program crop acre
(excluding payments for CRP and WRP) and operator age by program participation category.  As
shown in Table 1, the Non-Participants received low payments in 1992 ($4.40 per acre), reflecting
their non-participation in government programs that year, and zero payments in 1997, by definition.
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The Base Builders received slightly higher payments in 1992 ($6.58) but received significantly higher
payments in 1997 ($23.17), above the $21.75 average for all groups.  These levels reflect their non-
participation in 1992 and, presumably, their higher accumulated base by 1997.  The Other Participants
received relatively high payments in both years, with average payments of $27.93 and $23.22 in 1992
and 1997, respectively.  The final column of Table 1 reports the average operator age in 1992 across
the different program participation groups. Non-Participants were the oldest at 50.64 years on average,
about 2.5 years older than the average for Participants (48.08 years).
Tables 2-4 report regression results in which we estimate the impact of the participation groups
on program-crop acreage change, after controlling for state, SIC code, sales class at the state and
national  level,  operator  age,  and  various  interactions.    In  table  2,  we  examine  the  impact  of  the
participation groups, with the Base Builders disaggregated.  Results for the basic specification are
listed in the first column, with results from specifications with progressively more controls ordered to
the right.  Results from the basic specification indicate that after controlling for Age and Age
2, State,
SIC, and Sales Class, the Non-Participants had –20.91 percentage points lower growth in program-crop
                                                
11 Non-Participants may have received disaster or other kinds of payments emanating from programs that were not
terminated with the 1996 Act.  In 1997, however, nearly all payments (except conservation payments, which we omit) were
comprised of decoupled PFC payments.16
acres than the Other Participants.  On the other hand, growth for the Base Builders was 1.75 points
higher relative to the Other Participants.  As additional controls are added to this specification, the fit
of  the  model  improves  from  an  R
2  of  0.021  in  the  basic  model  to  0.104  in  the  model  with  full
interactions, but the magnitudes of the effects across the different participation groups are robust to the
specification choice.  As additional controls are  added, the differences in program-acreage change
between  the  groups  decrease  only  slightly,  suggesting  that  unobserved  factors  associated  with  the
participation categories are not driving the results.  In the model with full interactions, we estimate that
the growth rates for Non-Participants and Base Builders differed from the Other Participants by –18.72
and 1.58 percentage points, respectively.
The same analysis is repeated with the Base  Builders included with  the  Other  Participants
(table 3).  The basic regression results indicate that Non-Participants increase program acres by 21.06
percentage points less than all the aggregated Participants.  As additional controls are added, the fit
improves from an R
2 of 0.021 to 0.104 in the model with full interactions. However, the estimated
effects decline only slightly with the inclusion of the additional controls.  The estimates from the
model with full interactions are that Non-Participants grew by 19.16 percentage points less than the
Participants.
We repeat the analysis again, this time restricting attention to the 32,027 farms that remained
the same size between 1992 and 1997 (table 4).  The fit of the model ranges from an R
2 of 0.042 in the
basic model to 0.168 with the full set of interactions.  Although changes in overall farm size are
restricted  to  zero,  we  still  observe  the  same  basic  pattern  of  relative  changes  across  the  different
participation groups.  We estimate that Non-Participants increase by 10.44 to 8.28 percentage points
less  than  Participants,  according  to  our  basic  and  most  complex  specifications,  respectively.    By
restricting attention to farms of the same size, we attempt to restrict our sample to farms that retained
the same land base in the two periods.  The decline in the magnitude of the coefficient indicates that
some of the difference in program-crop acreage changes between Participants and Non-Participants
might  be  attributed  to  a  decline  in  total  acres  for  the  latter.    However  the  results  indicate  that  a17
substantial portion of the effect could reflect reallocation of the same land base to different crops,
rather than structural changes across operations.
Summarizing our results so far, we have found that farm program participation was associated
with  relative  increase  in  program  crop  acreage  between  1992  and  1997—a  period  spanning  the
decoupling of farm programs. This result appears robust to model specification suggesting that our
estimates of the effect of decoupling on program growth are not biased in an important manner by
unobservable  factors  correlated  with  the  program  participation  and  program-crop  acreage  growth.
While the aggregate effect of decoupling appears substantial, the effect is likely to differ across farms
of different scales and types.  To examine how the effect varies across farm typologies we compare
program participant and non-participant growth rates across sales categories and SIC codes.
We first consider variation across farms in terms of their levels of sales of program crops,
differentiated by the categories described above.  Table 5 reveals that the Non-Participants and Base
Builders on average have lower program-crop sales.  About 76% of all Non-Participants and 50% of
all Base Builders lie within the lowest sales category.  The Base Builders and Other Participants are
spread out more evenly across the different sales categories.
Table  5  shows  how  the  aggregate  means  obscure  much  larger  difference  in  program-crop
acreage  growth  rates  between  participants  and  non-participants  for  particular  sales  classes.
Nevertheless, while the changes vary in magnitude, the qualitative pattern observed in Tables 1-4
persists within each of the five sales classes.  Changes in acreage in program crops ranged from -21.90
to -13.16 percentage points for Non-Participants, and ranged from –2.38 to +13.06 percentage points
for Participants.   The difference among the groups is most dramatic for farms in the lowest sales class.
For farms with less than $35,001 in 1992 program-crop sales, Non-Participants decreased program
crop  acreage  by  21.90  percentage  points,  while  Participants  actually  increased  acreage  by  13.06
percentage  points.    For  farms  with  the  largest  sales,  the  general  pattern  is  also  evident:  Non-
Participants with sales over $246,927 decreased program-crop acres by 15.97 percentage points while
Participants with similar sales experienced a decline of just 2.38 points.18
We next examine whether observed variation in program-acre change across the participation
groups persists across farms engaged in the production of different crops.   For each sales class, table 6
reports the average change in program-crop acres for each of the six SIC codes in our sample.  In
contrast to the aggregate averages, Non-Participants primarily growing soybeans experienced positive
growth in program crop acres in the first and fourth sales classes.  Within each SIC code and sales
class, however, the Non-Participants still experience greater declines (or lower growth) relative to the
Participants for wheat, corn, soybeans, cash grains, and cotton.  Standard errors are too high to make
statistically significant comparisons for rice farms.
Tables  5  and  6  suggest  that  the  change  in  program  crop  acres  from  1992  to  1997  varied
significantly across different categories of farm program participation, sales classes, and SIC codes.
However, the basic pattern and magnitude of impacts shown by the simple means in Table 1 is robust
to a series of increasingly complex controls.
Conclusion
In order to reduce trade distortions brought about by domestic agricultural programs, trade negotiations
concluded in 1994 resulted in international agreements to limit expenditures on agricultural subsidies,
with  exceptions  made  for  decoupled  income  support  payments.  Decoupled  payments—lump-sum
income transfers to farm operators that do not depend on current production or commodity prices—are
generally thought to have little or no effect on production or trade.   In the US, the 1996 FAIR Act that
decoupled  farm  payments  from  production  was  expected  to  enhance  efficiency  by  removing
constraints  on  planting  and  distortionary  incentives  to  over-produce,  while  bringing  the  US  into
compliance with WTO rules. Current agricultural trade controversies exist over the magnitude and
nature of US farm payments, which exceeded $20 billion annually between 1999 and 2001.  Some
have argued that decoupled payments are themselves distortionary and provide farmers with incentives
to overproduce.19
This paper examined the effect of the 1996 commodity payment decoupling on program crop
acreage using farm-level Agricultural Census data.  We compared the growth in program-crop acreage
of program participants and non-participants between 1992 and 1997, a period spanning the decoupling
of  farm  programs.    We  found  that  program  participation  was  associated  with  a  relatively  greater
growth in program-crop acreage over this period.  This result suggests that decoupling—a regime
change in which payments with strong links to production decisions are removed and replaced with
payments with few or no links to production decisions—had the effect of increasing program-crop
production for those farms directly affected by the program.
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There are three possible explanations for our results.  First, the results may imply that program
participation  rules  associated  with  coupled  programs  effectively  limited  program  acreage  in  1992.
Program participants desired to produce more program crops in 1992 but were constrained by acreage-
reduction  programs  and  rules  governing  the  maintenance  of  base  acreage.    Under  this  scenario,
decoupling freed farmers to expand production onto new land and land that had previously been idled.
If this hypothesis is correct, decoupling may have removed distortions but with potentially negative
impacts on trading partners (and domestic non-participants) in the short run.
A second possible explanation for our results is that the decoupled programs may themselves
be  distortionary,  inducing  farmers  to  produce  more  than  they  would  have  otherwise.    Under  this
scenario, farmers who normally would have reduced their acreage of program crops by shifting into
non-program crops, switching to non-crop uses, or by renting or selling their land, instead maintained
or increased their levels of program-crop production.
A  third  explanation  is  that  participating  farmers  had  not  yet  reacted  to  the  new  flexibility
granted by the 1996 Act.  Beginning in late 1996 and into 1997, commodity prices began falling.  In
response to falling commodity prices, non-participating farmers may have reduced program acreages.
                                                
12 Our results do not indicate whether decoupling increased program-crop production overall, just that it affected the
relative change for Participants versus Non-Participants.20
Non-participating  farmers,  unaccustomed  to  the  newly  increased  sensitivity  of  their  income  to
commodity prices, may have been slower to react to changing prices.
13
In future research, it would be interesting to examine program-crop acreage change between the
1987  and  1992  censuses  and  between  the  1997  and  2002  censuses  to  determine  whether  our
assignment groups responded differently between different farm bills.  This examination may help to
verify whether our estimated effects are due to the assignment itself or to the unique nature of the 1996
Act.  It would also be interesting to explore how non-participating farms changed their plantings of
non-program crops, as well as their allocations of land among non-cropping activities such as pasture
and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  This information may provide deeper insight into
whether the 1996 Act removed participation-constraints that had restrained the production of program
crops, or whether the decoupled payments themselves stimulated the production of these crops by the
participating farmers.
                                                
13 We thank Roger Claassen for suggesting this highly plausible explanation of our findings.21
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Table 1: Mean Change in Program Crop Acres, 1992-1997,

























-17.25 4.40 0.00 50.40 Non-
Participants
1992 set aside=0  &
1997 payments = 0 35,461 (0.46) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08)
4.39 6.58 23.17 48.78 Base Builders 1992 set aside = 0 &
1997 payments > 0 44,983 (0.31) (0.05) (0.19) (0.06)




1992 set aside > 0 112,321
(0.17) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04)
Participants 1992 set aside >= 0 &









0.59 22.20 21.75 48.24 All Farms 1992 set aside >= 0 &
1997 payments >= 0 192,765 (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
1 Set aside = set aside acres as percentage of program crop acres in 1992.
2 Percent change in program-crop acres = 200*(1997 program-crop acres – 1992 program-crop acres)/(1992
program-crop acres + 1997 program-crop acres).
3 Standard errors are in parentheses.24
Table 2.  Regression Results under Various Model Specifications with “Base Builders” Disaggregated
Dependent Variable:  Percent-Change in 1992 Program Acres












































State Fixed Effects X X X X X
SIC-code Fixed Effects X X X X X
Sales Class (All Farms) X X X X X
Age and Age squared X X X X
State-Specific
Total Sales Class X X X
State-Specific
Program Sales Class X X X
SIC-Specific
Sales Class X X X
State*SIC*State-
Specific Sales Class X X
(Age and Age
2)*State-













2 0.021 0.062 0.066 0.087 0.104
Observations = 192,765
1 Percent change in program-crop acres = 200*(1997 program-crop acres – 1992 program-crop acres)/(1992
program-crop acres + 1997 program-crop acres).
2 Standard errors are in parentheses.25
Table 3. Regression Results under Various Model Specifications with “Base Builders” Not Disaggregated
Dependent Variable:  Percent-Change in 1992 Program Acres



































State Fixed Effects X X X X X
SIC-code Fixed Effects X X X X X
Sales Class (All Farms) X X X X X
Age and Age
2 X X X X
State-Specific
Total Sales Class X X X
State-Specific
Program Sales Class X X X
SIC-Specific
Sales Class X X X
State*SIC*State-
Specific Sales Class X X
(Age and Age
2)*State-













2 0.021 0.062 0.066 0.087 0.101
Observations = 192,765
1 Percent change in program-crop acres = 200*(1997 program-crop acres – 1992 program-crop acres)/(1992
program-crop acres + 1997 program-crop acres).
2 Participants includes Base Builders.
3 Standard errors are in parentheses.26
Table 4. Regression Results under Various Model Specifications with “Base Builders” Not Disaggregated
and Limited to Farms with Same Amount of Land in 1992 and 1997
Dependent Variable:  Percent-Change in 1992 Program Acres



































State Fixed Effects X X X X X
SIC-code Fixed
Effects X X X X X
Sales Class (All
Farms) X X X X X
Age and Age
2 X X X X
State-Specific
Total Sales Class X X X
State-Specific
Program Sales Class X X X
SIC-Specific
Sales Class X X X
State*SIC*State-
Specific Sales Class X X
(Age and Age
2)*State-













2 0.042 0.045 0.049 0.124 0.168
Observations = 32,027
1 Percent change in program-crop acres = 200*(1997 program-crop acres – 1992 program-crop acres)/(1992
program-crop acres + 1997 program-crop acres).
2 Participants includes Base Builders.
3 Standard errors are in parentheses.27
Table 5: Average Change in Program Crop Acres, 1992-1997,


























-21.90 3.91 0.00 52.68 Non-Participants 26,958 (0.64) (0.07) (0.00) (0.10)
13.06 18.84 22.15 50.59
$0
to
$35,000 Participants 50,143 (0.38) (0.08) (0.25) (0.07)
-19.06 4.43 0.00 50.46 Non-Participants 4,322 (1.34) (0.15) (0.00) (0.22)
4.72 21.04 22.41 49.25
$35,001
to
$76,000 Participants 34,235 (0.36) (0.09) (0.16) (0.08)
-13.42 5.20 0.00 49.01 Non-Participants 2,425 (1.60) (0.21) (0.00) (0.28)
2.20 22.60 23.31 47.70
$76,001
to
$157,480 Participants 36,069 (0.29) (0.09) (0.25) (0.07)
-13.16 4.42 0.00 48.09 Non-Participants 925 (2.39) (0.30) (0.00) (0.43)
1.71 24.42 23.98 47.02
$157,481
to
$246,927 Participants 18,411 (0.37) (0.13) (0.19) (0.09)
-15.97 4.20 0.00 50.21 Non-Participants 831 (2.36) (0.34) (0.00) (0.46)
-2.38 25.93 23.27 47.86
Greater than
$246,927
Participants 18,446 (0.36) (0.15) (0.20) (0.09)
1 Participants include Base Builders.
2 Percent change in program-crop acres = 200*(1997 program-crop acres – 1992 program-crop acres)/(1992
program-crop acres + 1997 program-crop acres).
3 Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 6: Mean Change in Program Crop Acres, 1992-1997,
by Sales, Farm-Program Participation Group, and Standard Industry Classification (SIC)




















72.08 -28.68 4.62 -27.43 -43.52 Non-Participants -19.58
(1.74) (64.05) (1.01) (1.48) (1.16) (6.57)




(0.80) (19.38) (0.70) (1.00) (0.73) (2.69)
-180.93 -20.91 -5.13 -19.38 -14.84 Non-Participants -22.16
(4.01) (18.90) (2.36) (3.17) (2.17) (10.74)




(0.84) (10.17) (0.62) (1.08) (0.61) (2.50)
-17.25 -19.79 -3.85 -16.15 2.68 Non-Participants -10.90
(4.51) (17.93) (2.86) (4.70) (2.54) (8.14)




(0.76) (5.86) (0.48) (1.06) (0.49) (1.73)
-22.14 -16.30 -8.48 -14.22 10.66 Non-Participants -17.85
(6.63) (17.98) (4.27) (8.57) (3.90) (7.99)




(1.10) (4.41) (0.57) (1.57) (0.61) (1.63)
0.14 -16.47 -8.23 -15.42 -16.59 Non-Participants -18.60
(7.15) (15.73) (4.07) (9.51) (4.00) (6.60)




(1.50) (3.51) (0.56) (1.64) (0.57) (1.20)
1 Participants include Base Builders.
2 Percent change in program-crop acres = 200*(1997 program-crop acres – 1992 program-crop acres)/(1992 program-crop acres + 1997 program-crop
acres).
3 Standard errors are in parentheses.